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THE LAWYER’S MONOPOLY—WHAT GOES  
AND WHAT STAYS 
Benjamin H. Barton* 
 
We live in a time of unprecedented changes for American lawyers, 
probably the greatest changes since the Great Depression.  That period saw 
the creation of the lawyer’s monopoly through a series of regulatory 
modifications.  Will we see the same following the Great Recession?  
Formally, no.  This Article predicts that formal lawyer regulation in 2023 
will look remarkably similar to lawyer regulation in 2013.  This is because 
lawyer regulators will not want to rock the boat in the profession or in law 
schools during a time of roil. 
Informally, yes!  We are already seeing a combination of 
computerization, outsourcing, and nonlawyer practice radically reshape the 
market for law from one that centers on individualized, hourly work done 
for clients to a market of much cheaper, commoditized legal products.  This 
trend will accelerate over time.  The upshot?  Formal lawyer regulation 
will continue on with little change, but will cover an ever-shrinking 
proportion of the market for legal services.  
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INTRODUCTION 
My very first law review article was published in 2001.1  The article 
contrasted the various economic justifications for lawyer regulation with the 
regulations themselves.2  The article reached the then radical conclusion 
that we should deregulate the profession altogether, except for the 
regulations that dealt with in-court appearances.3  I argued that most lawyer 
regulation was self-interested, anticompetitive, and unnecessary for 
consumer protection, but that some regulation should remain to protect the 
courts.4  I used this paper as my “job talk,” the paper I presented to law 
schools considering hiring me as a tenure-track professor.  Unsurprisingly, I 
encountered significant resistance and faced some tough audiences.  In 
particular, there was general agreement that, regardless of the merits of my 
suggestions, there was no chance they would come to fruition.  I was told 
repeatedly that lawyer regulators would never pare back their regulatory 
authority so radically. 
Ironically, these critics were half right.  Lawyer regulators—meaning 
state supreme courts and bar associations—will not consciously cede so 
much authority.  In fact, half of this Article’s argument is exactly that:  in 
the face of unprecedented change and roil in the market for legal services, 
lawyer regulators will hunker down and change as little as possible. 
Unfortunately for lawyer regulators, just twelve short years after my first 
law review article called for broad deregulation, the nature of the market for 
legal services has changed so radically that my proposed solution is likely 
to become the de facto status quo sooner rather than later.  Between 
computerization, outsourcing, insourcing, and nonlawyer workers, lawyers 
will have to share their turf outside of court, and, as a result, the effect of 
lawyer regulations will likewise be pared back. 
This Article makes five arguments:  (1) the market for legal services is 
changing radically, and the portion of the market reserved for lawyers is 
shrinking; (2) in the face of these radical changes, lawyer regulators will not 
want to rock the boat in stormy seas, so the letter of current lawyer 
regulation will remain substantially the same; (3) maintaining the status quo 
in regulation will actually result in a substantial deregulation of the market 
for legal services as that market continues to transform around lawyer 
regulators; (4) lawyer regulation will remain at its most potent for in-court 
 
 1. Benjamin Hoorn Barton, Why Do We Regulate Lawyers?:  An Economic Analysis of 
the Justification for Entry and Conduct Regulation, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 429 (2001). 
 2. See generally id. 
 3. Id. at 456–63. 
 4. See generally id. 
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activities and at its weakest for out-of-court, nonlitigation “legal work”; and 
(5) this will work out wonderfully for consumers of legal services. 
The Article proceeds as follows:  Part I briefly describes the changes that 
are occurring in the market for legal services.  Part II summarizes the 
current state of lawyer regulation—who the regulators are and how they 
have reacted to the market changes.  Part III argues that the regulators are 
unlikely to radically change their approach, which will result in a 
substantial deregulation of the market for legal services even as lawyers 
remain heavily regulated.  The Article concludes in Part IV by hedging a bit 
and describing some other possible scenarios, including the nuclear option 
of a large-scale attempt to enforce prohibitions against the unauthorized 
practice of law. 
I.  RADICAL CHANGE FINALLY COMES TO THE LEGAL MARKET 
British legal futurist Richard Susskind uses the term “bespoke” to 
describe the way lawyers have practiced law for hundreds of years.5  
Bespoke was originally a tailoring term, denoting made-to-order clothes for 
individuals.  It has since come to be used more broadly to refer to any 
individualized, custom service.  The private practice of law has largely 
consisted of individual lawyers representing individual clients on individual 
legal matters.  Billing is typically by the hour, or sometimes by the task, but 
the work itself is individualized, as opposed to commoditized and sold en 
masse. 
Legal practice has changed in tools (consider computers) and in scope 
(the rise of the massive law firm), but not in kind.  Law may have changed 
less than any other area of the economy over the last 150 years.  The same 
basic product is being sold and the same basic services (e.g., researching the 
law, drafting legal documents, appearing in court) are being performed. 
If the last 150 years have taught us anything, however, it is the 
relentlessness of technology.  In one field of endeavor after another, 
mechanization, routinization, and commoditization have replaced 
individualized services.  The Industrial Revolution brought mass production 
to manufacturing.  Everything from shoes to clothes to automobiles 
changed from individually made to factory produced.  Over time, these 
items grew cheaper and better, as mass production allowed for advances in 
quality and cost.  Some bespoke providers remained for the highest-end 
work, but very few.6 
Lawyers and other professionals who relied on intellect survived (and 
thrived) through these changes, as it proved impossible to mechanize 
complex, brain-heavy activities like practicing law.  The information 
revolution and the continuous growth in the power and speed of computers, 
however, have started to bring knowledge workers to heel.  In multiple 
 
 5. RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS? 36–39 (2008). 
 6. See Laurel S. Terry, The Legal World Is Flat:  Globalization and Its Effect on 
Lawyers Practicing in Non-global Law Firms, 28 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 527, 532–47 
(2008). 
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areas of the economy, computers now handle work once done on an 
individualized basis by highly paid professionals. 
The pattern for these changes was set in the Industrial Revolution and 
continues today.  Bespoke work done by individuals for other individuals 
on a custom basis is supplanted by standardized work, and then 
commoditized, mass produced, and sold at a much, much lower cost.  The 
total number of people needed to create the good goes down, as does the 
average wage earned by those in the industry.  The few at the top who 
control the process or design the product, however, make much more than 
any former provider of bespoke services ever could.  Bespoke services 
naturally remain for the most complicated and lucrative work.  Over time, 
however, as alternatives to expensive work by well-paid humans get better, 
the share of the market that is bespoke inevitably shrinks. 
The evidence that this process has begun in earnest for lawyers surrounds 
us.  Computerization, outsourcing, insourcing, and nonlawyer workers are 
all replacing traditional legal work.  Lawyers practicing law the old-
fashioned way—by the hour, performing individualized work for individual 
clients—are being replaced by alternate providers or new business models.  
We are only in the initial stages of this revolution, but if the information 
age’s script holds true, the rest of the story is not hard to see. 
A.  Computerization—Overview 
The computerization of legal services is occurring across multiple fronts.  
As John McGinnis and Russell Pearce’s scholarship establishes, we are in 
the very early stages of the computerization of legal services, and what 
appears to be state of the art today is likely to seem crude and rudimentary 
in the near future.7  Right now, computerization is reaching low-hanging 
fruit:  using predictive coding and search engines to mechanize electronic 
discovery or using the internet and interactive forms to draft simple legal 
documents.  These relatively basic uses of computing power are already 
displacing the work of lawyers, but they are really only the tip of the 
iceberg.  The best, or perhaps the worst, is yet to come. 
Techno-skeptics note that computerization right now is very mechanical 
and misses much of the nuance and complexity in legal argumentation.  
Skeptics also note that it will be a long time before a computer can actually 
simulate the high-level human thinking necessary to practice law.8 
Computers do not need to simulate human thinking to handle 
complicated mental tasks, however.  For example, two recent triumphs of 
computer intelligence include IBM’s Deep Blue defeating chess grand 
 
 7. John O. McGinnis & Russell G. Pearce, The Great Disruption:  How Machine 
Intelligence Will Transform the Role of Lawyers in the Delivery of Legal Services, 82 
FORDHAM L. REV. 3041, 3046 (2014). 
 8. See, e.g., Stuart LaRosa, Why Machines Can’t Replace Lawyers, XEROX BLOGS 
(June 19, 2012), http://ediscoverytalk.blogs.xerox.com/2012/06/19/why-machines-can%E2%
80%99t-replace-lawyers/. 
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master Garry Kasparov and IBM’s Watson defeating Jeopardy champions.9  
In both cases, the computers won not because they imitated human 
cognition.  To the contrary, Deep Blue and Watson triumphed by doing 
what computers do exceptionally well—performing an avalanche of 
calculations on a mass of data very quickly.10 
Chess is a complicated game, but it has clear boundaries:  a set number of 
squares, pieces, and rules for how and where each piece can move.11  
Nevertheless, because of the number of possible moves and the length of 
the game, there are too many possible moves and outcomes for even the 
most powerful current computer to consider every move.12  Likewise, it is 
very hard to program a computer to think strategically like a human being.13 
Deep Blue circumvented these problems with a mix of chess strategy and 
brute computing power.14  In order to determine the best move, Deep Blue 
considered many more moves than any human could and also consulted a 
database filled with the results of hundreds of thousands of chess games 
played by grand masters, and could thus choose a move that had been the 
most likely to be successful in the past.15  Thus, a human plays not only a 
computer, but also the ghosts of grand masters past.  Deep Blue did not 
defeat chess masters via superior strategy or tactics; it won by performing 
so many calculations so quickly on such a mass of data that humans were 
eventually outmatched.16 
Jeopardy presented a much messier problem for computers.  It requires 
an understanding of puns, natural language, and nuance.17  Watson 
followed the Deep Blue playbook for defeating humans.  It loaded up more 
data than a human could memorize and then used a computer capable of 
searching 200 million pages of text in a second to analyze each Jeopardy 
answer to find the suitable response.18  Watson worked from about a 
terabyte of searchable text, including the entirety of Wikipedia, a complete 
dictionary, a complete thesaurus, the Bible, the Internet Movie Database, 
and other documents.19  For each Jeopardy answer, Watson searched its 
 
 9. McGinnis & Pearce, supra note 7, at 3045; Deep Blue, IBM, http://www-
03.ibm.com/ibm/history/ibm100/us/en/icons/deepblue/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
 10. McGinnis & Pearce, supra note 7, at 3044–46. 
 11. NATE SILVER, THE SIGNAL AND THE NOISE 265–92 (2012); Marshall Barin, How Was 
IBM’s Watson Computer Able To Answer the Questions on Jeopardy?  How Did the 
Technology Work?  How Might It Be Used?, HOWSTUFFWORKS (Feb. 18, 2011), 
http://blogs.howstuffworks.com/2011/02/18/how-was-ibms-watson-computer-able-to-
answer-the-questions-on-jeopardy-how-did-the-technology-work-how-might-it-be-used/; 
Deep Blue, supra note 9; The Science Behind Watson, IBM, http://www-03.ibm.com/
innovation/us/watson/the_jeopardy_challenge.shtml (last visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
 12. SILVER, supra note 11, at 269. 
 13. Id. at 273. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 276–85. 
 16. Id. at 279, 283. 
 17. David Davidian, IBM Watson Does Not Answer Questions Like Humans, IBM (Feb. 
14, 2011), https://www-304.ibm.com/connections/blogs/davidian/entry/ibm_watson_does_
not_answer_questions_like_humans18?lang=en_us. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Barin, supra note 11. 
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database using different algorithms and came to an expected best answer.20  
When Watson was sure enough of an answer (the probability that its answer 
was correct was high enough), it rang in and answered.21 
Both Deep Blue and Watson triumphed not by beating humans at their 
own game, but by doing what computers do well (calculations and searches 
through large datasets) very quickly.  In law the question is not whether a 
computer can accurately imitate the way humans think.  Rather, it is 
whether brute computing power and speed can allow computers to reach 
appropriate answers through different routes.  In particular, much legal 
work consists of analyzing legal arguments and predicting future outcomes 
like the range of results from an ongoing litigation.  Insurance companies 
already use their vast reservoir of data to set settlement amounts, determine 
legal strategies, and choose which cases to litigate and how.  Lex Machina, 
a legal data and analytics company, claims to do the same for intellectual 
property litigation.22  Much of the raw data of legal work (briefs, SEC 
filings, even oral arguments) are publicly available and thus potentially 
available for a predictive computer dataset. 
Further, computers do not necessarily need to be better than humans to 
replace humans.  Once data is gathered, software is written, and processes 
are created, computers are much cheaper than humans.  The computer 
programs that now handle document review claim to be at least as accurate 
as humans.  But even if they were less accurate, if they are 10 percent of the 
price or lower, computers do not need to be better; they just need to be 
acceptable. 
B.  Computerization’s Many Faces 
The most obvious examples of computerization in legal services are 
online forms providers like LegalZoom and Rocket Lawyer.  These 
companies provide both blank and interactive forms to online consumers 
for matters ranging from entity formation (LLCs, corporations, S-corps), to 
trademarks, simple contracts, patents, wills and trusts, bankruptcy, and 
divorce, among many others.23 
LegalZoom filed an S-1 form with the SEC in 2012 in advance of a 
possible initial public offering (IPO).24  The IPO has been shelved for the 
 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. See Lex Machina Introduces Legal Analytics To Power Data-Driven IP Business 
Strategy, LEX MACHINA (Oct. 29, 2013), https://lexmachina.com/media/press/lex-machina-
introduces-legal-analytics-to-power-data-driven-ip-business-strategy/. 
 23. See, e.g., Legal Documents & Legal Forms, ROCKET LAW., 
http://www.rocketlawyer.com/legal-documents-forms.rl (last visited Apr. 26, 2014); Our 
Products & Services, LEGALZOOM, http://www.legalzoom.com/products-and-services.html 
(last visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
 24. LegalZoom.com, Inc., Registration Statement (Amendment No. 1 to Form S-1) 
(June 4, 2012) [hereinafter LegalZoom Form S-1], available at http://www.sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/1286139/000104746912006446/a2209713zs-1a.htm. 
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time being,25 but the S-1 remains the first widely available public data 
about LegalZoom.  As one would expect pre-IPO, it tells a rosy tale of 
growing revenues and future profits.  The overview: 
We developed our easy-to-use, online legal platform to make the law 
more accessible to small businesses and consumers.  Our scalable 
technology platform enables the efficient creation of personalized legal 
documents, automates our supply chain and fulfillment workflow 
management, and provides customer analytics to help us improve our 
services.  For small businesses and consumers who want legal advice, we 
offer subscription legal plans that connect our customers with experienced 
attorneys who participate in our legal plan network. 
We have served approximately two million customers over the last 10 
years. In 2011, nine out of ten of the approximately 34,000 customers 
who responded to a survey we provided said they would recommend 
LegalZoom to their friends and family.  Our customers placed 
approximately 490,000 orders and more than 20 percent of new California 
limited liability companies were formed using our online legal platform in 
2011.  We believe the volume of transactions processed through our 
online legal platform creates a scale advantage that deepens our 
knowledge and enables us to improve the quality and depth of the services 
we provide to our customers.26 
This description helps lay out the full scope of the threat to traditional 
lawyers.  LegalZoom generated 20 percent of the new LLC filings in 
California in 2011.27  Some of these customers may not have been able to 
afford a lawyer in the first instance, but drafting LLC forms or 
incorporating businesses has long been a staple of legal practice.  That 20 
percent of new LLC filings in California went to LegalZoom is not a 
promising sign for traditional lawyers.  Moreover, LegalZoom (and its 
many competitors) seem unlikely to stall at only 20 percent of that business. 
LegalZoom and Rocket Lawyer are for-profit, but there are significant 
free sources of legal forms as well.  For example, the Legal Services 
Corporation has started a website of publicly available free legal forms,28 
and some state court systems have as well.29  Chicago-Kent College of Law 
has created the “A2J Author” project, an interactive platform meant to spur 
the online provision of free legal documents for the poor.30  While these 
forms are often aimed at the indigent, anyone with an internet connection 
and a printer can examine or use them. 
 
 25. Olivia Oran, LegalZoom IPO Delayed, REUTERS (Aug. 2, 2012, 4:40 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/02/legalzoom-idUSL2E8J2EZF20120802. 
 26. LegalZoom Form S-1, supra note 24, at 1. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Fill Out Legal Forms Faster, L. HELP INTERACTIVE, https://lawhelpinteractive.org/ 
(last visited Feb. 27, 2014). 
 29. See, e.g., Family Law Forms Index, MD. COURTS, http://mdcourts.gov/family/
forms/index.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2014); Online Court Assistance Program, UTAH ST. 
COURTS, http://www.utcourts.gov/ocap/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
 30. A2J Author, IIT CHI.-KENT C.L., http://www.kentlaw.iit.edu/institutes-centers/
center-for-access-to-justice-and-technology/a2j-author (last visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
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Online forms providers claim that they do not to provide legal advice.31  
However, there are lawyer-form hybrids, where the customer fills in the 
legal forms and a licensed lawyer “reviews” them.  Richard Granat was a 
pioneer in this field with his fixed-fee divorces in Maryland at 
mdfamilylawyer.com.32  SmartLegalForms offers legal forms and legal 
advice by a lawyer in a packaged deal, with an explicit dig at LegalZoom, 
calling it a more expensive “non-lawyer document preparation service” and 
“the old way” of internet law.33  LegalZoom and Rocket Lawyer have 
responded by also offering lawyer review of their documents, as well as 
discounted deals for actual legal advice.34 
Many small firms’ and solo practitioners’ offices are occupying another 
middle space, essentially operating as a front for online forms providers.  
For example, the National Law Foundation offers “fully-editable form(s)” 
to lawyers for “as low as $19,” covering virtually every type of legal 
drafting.35  Similarly, state bar associations are creating online databases of 
interactive forms for use by their members, with an explicit eye towards 
“competition from web-based companies like LegalZoom and Rocket 
Lawyer.”36 
There are also websites offering free or very inexpensive legal advice.  
For instance, there is the truly free provision of advice in online 
communities like MetaFilter.37  The acronyms “IANAL” (“I am not a 
lawyer”) and “IAALBNYL” (“I am a lawyer, but not your lawyer”)38 are 
common introductions to question-and-answer sessions on legal matters.  
The advice is general and informal, but is permanent, searchable, and 
available to the public. 
Other websites attempt to leverage free legal advice into business for the 
lawyers who answer the requests for advice.  Avvo is a website that serves 
 
 31. See, e.g., LEGALZOOM, http://www.legalzoom.com (last visited Apr. 26, 2014) 
(stating under the heading “Disclaimer” that “[w]e are not a law firm or a substitute for an 
attorney or law firm.  We cannot provide any kind of advice, explanation, opinion, or 
recommendation about possible legal rights, remedies, defenses, options, selection of forms 
or strategies”). 
 32. Fixed Fee Online Legal Services, MDFAMILYLAWYER.COM, http://www.
mdfamilylawyer.com/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
 33. SmartLegalForms vs. LegalZoom, SMARTLEGALFORMS, http://www.smartlegalforms
.com/smartlegalforms-vs-legalzoom.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
 34. Find an Attorney You Can Trust for Your Family, LEGALZOOM, 
http://www.legalzoom.com/attorneys-lawyers/legal-plans/personal.html (last visited Apr. 26, 
2014); Get Connected with an on Call Lawyer:  Members Save Thousands of Dollars with 
Pre-negotiated Rates, ROCKET LAW., http://www.rocketlawyer.com/find-a-lawyer.rl (last 
visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
 35. Practical Forms for Attorneys, NAT’L L. FOUND., http://www.nlfforms.com/ (last 
visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
 36. John G. Locallo, Behind the Technology Curve?  The ISBA Can Help, 100 ILL. B.J. 
124 (2012). 
 37. For a great discussion of this site, see Cassandra Burke Robertson, The Facebook 
Disruption:  How Social Media May Transform Civil Litigation and Facilitate Access to 
Justice, 65 ARK. L. REV. 75, 84–85 (2012). 
 38. IAALBNYL, METAFILTER (Dec. 21, 2007, 11:15 AM), http://metatalk.metafilter.com/
15513/IAALBIANYL. 
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as an attorney evaluation service and offers free legal advice.39  Users post 
questions and attorneys answer them publicly.40  Avvo works like 
“Ask.com” or other crowdsourcing question-and-answer sites:  the answers 
are stored, browsable, and searchable.41  Avvo also has listings of lawyers, 
with a controversial (at least among lower-ranked lawyers), multifactor 
rating system.42  Avvo makes money through advertising on the site and 
selling “Avvo Pro,” a subscription service for lawyers to track their Avvo 
profile.43  Avvo thus leverages its ratings and traffic to draw lawyers into 
giving free advice with the hope of gaining paid work.  Avvo draws traffic 
and potential clients to the site with free advice or ratings. 
LawPivot offers more formal and confidential free legal advice.  Lawyers 
answer specific and detailed questions for free, again with an eye towards 
generating business.44  Rocket Lawyer recently acquired LawPivot.45  
Rocket Lawyer has kept LawPivot as a freestanding business, but also plans 
to adopt its question-and-answer method on its own site.46 
Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) is another source of competition.  
Colin Rule directed the eBay and PayPal ODR systems from 2003 to 
2011.47  EBay and PayPal are natural sites for ODR:  they have lots of low-
dollar transactions that occur across state and even international lines, 
making litigation cost prohibitive or simply impossible.48  The eBay 
process proved exceptionally successful, handling up to 60 million disputes 
per year, and settling approximately 90 percent of them with no human 
input on the company side.49 
Colin Rule and others licensed the eBay software and launched Modria, 
an ODR system for hire.50  Modria sells a “fairness engine” that attempts 
substantive as well as financial settlement of disputes.  It starts with a 
 
 39. About Us, AVVO, http://www.avvo.com/about_avvo (last visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id.; see also Adam W. Lasker, AVVO Launches Controversial Lawyer Bidding 
Service, 101 ILL. B.J. 68 (2013) (discussing the controversy). 
 43. Stephen Fairley, Using Avvo To Market Your Law Firm on the Internet, RAINMAKER 
BLOG (May 12, 2010), http://www.therainmakerblog.com/2010/05/articles/law-firm-
marketing-1/using-avvo-to-market-your-law-firm-on-the-internet/. 
 44. Leena Rao, Rocket Lawyer Acquires LawPivot To Add a Quora-Like Q&A Platform 
to Online Legal Services Site, TECH CRUNCH (Jan. 14, 2013), http://techcrunch.com/2013/
01/14/rocket-lawyer-acquires-lawpivot-to-add-a-quora-like-qa-platform-to-online-legal-
services-site/. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Julia Wilkinson, Colin Rule:  From eBay Conflicts to Global Peace Initiatives, 
ECOMMERCEBYTES.COM (June 26, 2011), http://www.ecommercebytes.com/cab/abu/y211/
m06/abu0289/s05. 
 48. Id. 
 49. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., POLICY ISSUES RELATED TO PATIENT 
REPORTED DATA 8 (2012), available at http://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/
archive/FACA%20Hearings/2012-06-08%20Policy%3A%20Meaningful%20Use%
20WG%20Patient%20Generated%20Health%20Data%20Hearing/dullabh_testimony_hitpc_
060812.pdf. 
 50. Wilkinson, supra note 47. 
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“diagnosis module” that gathers relevant information.51  A “negotiation 
module” summarizes areas of agreement and disagreement and makes 
suggestions for solving the issue.52  If these steps do not result in 
settlement, a “mediation module” with a neutral third party begins.53  The 
final step is arbitration.54  Modria claims that the “vast majority” of claims 
are settled in the first two steps without a human ever becoming involved.55  
Nor does Modria see itself only as a small claims alternative for e-business:  
it is targeting bigger-ticket disagreements, as well as complicated issues like 
patent disputes.56 
Modria regularly notes the expense of in-court litigation and court 
backlogs as selling points for its services.57  Online divorce mediation is a 
particularly hot area.  Modria and LawMediaLabs have created 
DivorceMediationResources.com,58 an online program meant to change 
contested divorces into uncontested divorces, i.e., to change divorces from 
work for lawyers to work for online retailers. 
The model has been so successful that UNCITRAL, the U.N. working 
group on international law, has sought to make it industry standard for 
cross-border e-commerce and business to business disputes.59  Like all of 
these technological advances, ODR is radically cheaper than using humans 
to resolve disputes, so if it continues to succeed, it will naturally drift up 
from lower-value disputes to higher-value ones. 
This brief overview of some of the new developments in the market for 
computerized legal services establishes that we are still in the early stages 
of the revolution, and that there is substantial uncertainty about which 
approaches will prove successful and lucrative long term.  The sheer 
volume of the activity and the type of venture capital involved, however, 
suggests that technology companies feel confident they can disrupt the 
current market and replace expensive human labor with cheaper 
information technology. 
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C.  Outsourcing 
Outsourcing takes two different forms.  The first, more obvious form, is 
finding cheaper lawyers overseas to do corporate legal work.  Pangea3 is a 
fast growing “legal process outsourcing” (LPO) firm that employs English-
speaking and common law–trained lawyers in India to do legal work like 
document review or due diligence that used to be done in the United 
States.60  Pangea3 claims to have grown between 40 and 60 percent per 
year since its founding in 2004 and currently employs 850 lawyers.61  
Pangea3 was successful enough to be purchased by legal information giant 
Thomson Reuters in 2010.62  As of yet, LPO work has passed muster under 
state prohibitions of the unauthorized practice of law because the LPO 
provider is working under a licensed lawyer, who is ultimately responsible 
for the work.63  Pangea3 has not moved outside of corporate legal work yet, 
but as outsourcing proves workable, it seems likely that wills drafted in 
India for American jurisdictions will become more prevalent. 
Computerized LPO vendors are offering a completely different version of 
the product:  replacing routine and large-scale discovery and due diligence 
work that has previously been done by imperfect humans with powerful 
computers.  Both the Atlantic and the Wall Street Journal have highlighted 
the advantages in accuracy and cost of using computers to do large-scale 
discovery work.64  The computer programmers claim that these programs 
are radically cheaper and more accurate than humans.65  Using predictive 
search and artificial intelligence for e-discovery is the simplest and most 
basic application of computer power.  Programmers are already working on 
computer generated legal briefs or research memos.66 
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D.  Insourcing 
Corporate law departments have grown larger and more powerful.  The 
general counsel, and not outside counsel, is now the main source of legal 
counsel and advice to corporate leadership and is in charge of divvying out 
the work.67  The Harvard Business Review (HBR) has noted the change in 
the nature and stature of in-house counsel.  These offices no longer are 
staffed by former big-law generalists, but by a bevy of high-quality 
specialists, headed up by a general counsel who is involved at all levels of 
corporate decisionmaking.68  The HBR’s upshot?  Larger and better in-
house counsel means “a smaller total legal spend (inside plus outside) for 
the company.”69 
This is partially because in-house corporate offices are frequently staffed 
with cheaper paralegals to perform routine tasks.70  Likewise, corporations 
are increasingly comfortable with computerization and outsourcing, 
diverting funds that used to go to large corporate law firms.71 
E.  Nonlawyers 
Cheaper nonlawyers are also starting to horn in on legal work.  Professor 
Bill Henderson looked at the U.S. Census data for “law office employment” 
and compared it to what the Census Bureau calls “all other legal 
services.”72  Law office employment has actually shrunk since 1998, while 
all other legal services have grown 8.5 percent annually and 140 percent 
over the entire period.73  The workers in the other legal services category 
are much cheaper.  The average job in a law office pays $80,000.74  The 
average other legal services job pays $46,000.75  There are still many, many 
more employees in law offices than in other legal services (1,172,748 
versus 23,504), but the growth and the trend in favor of nonlawyers is 
clear.76 
Examples of this growth in practice are settlement mills.  In these “law 
firms,” a few lawyers sit atop a pyramid of paralegals who do virtually all 
of the work.  Consider Nora Freeman Engstrom’s outstanding work on 
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settlement mills.77  She notes ten hallmark features of the settlement mills 
(in comparison to more traditional plaintiff’s side practice): 
Settlement mills necessarily (1) are high-volume personal injury practices 
that (2) engage in aggressive advertising from which they obtain a high 
proportion of their clients, (3) epitomize “entrepreneurial legal practices,” 
and (4) take few—if any—cases to trial.  In addition, settlement mills 
generally (5) charge tiered contingency fees; (6) do not engage in rigorous 
case screening and thus primarily represent victims with low-dollar 
claims; (7) do not prioritize meaningful attorney-client interaction; 
(8) incentivize settlements via mandatory quotas or by offering 
negotiators awards or fee-based compensation; (9) resolve cases quickly, 
usually within two-to-eight months of the accident; and (10) rarely file 
lawsuits.78 
Plaintiff’s side lawyers carry heavy caseloads, frequently as many as 
seventy open files at a time.79  But traditional plaintiff’s attorneys are pikers 
in comparison to the settlement mill counterpart:  settlement mill attorneys 
carry upwards of 200 to 300.80  How is it possible to carry such a high 
caseload?  Paralegals interview the clients and prepare the settlements with 
as little involvement from the lawyers as possible.81  Settlement mills have 
thus taken some cases that would have been handled in a bespoke manner 
by a lawyer working on a contingency fee and transferred them to 
nonlawyers.  Immigration law firms likewise tend to be paralegal heavy.82 
F.  The Upshot 
The upshot is that lawyers—from big law firms to solo practitioners—
have started to see a slow bleed of business to nonlawyers.  The spate of 
layoffs at large law firms and the continued shrinkage in solo practitioner 
earnings are all evidence of this process.  And unfortunately for lawyers, the 
process is just beginning.  Information technology improves exponentially 
as additional data and computing power becomes available. 
The scariest thing about LegalZoom and its kin is not that it is much 
cheaper than a live lawyer, but rather that it may soon be cheaper and 
better.  LegalZoom may eventually do a volume of business that will allow 
it to surpass the quality of individualized work.  As LegalZoom puts it:  
“The high volume of transactions we handle and feedback we receive from 
customers and government agencies give us a scale advantage that deepens 
our knowledge and enables us to further develop additional services to 
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address our customers’ needs and refine our business processes.”83  The 
feedback loop of providing forms, receiving customer and court feedback, 
and redesign may allow LegalZoom and others to operate at a level no 
single human lawyer can match. 
Nevertheless, protections against the unauthorized practice of law (UPL) 
mean that at least one realm will remain lawyers only:  the in-court practice 
of law.  This is because UPL is easiest to enforce in court before individual 
judges.  As long as judges continue to insist that only lawyers may 
represent clients in court, litigants will need to proceed pro se or pay for a 
lawyer. 
II.  CURRENT LAWYER REGULATION 
State supreme courts control lawyer regulation in all fifty states.84  Many 
state supreme courts have claimed an exclusive “inherent authority” to 
regulate lawyers, barring legislative encroachment.85  The “inherent 
powers” doctrine is an outgrowth of the constitutional separation of powers 
between the legislative and judicial branches.86  The inherent authority 
cases hold that a state constitution’s creation of a judicial branch 
presupposes certain uniquely “judicial” powers, including the regulation of 
lawyers.87 
State supreme court inherent authority over lawyer regulation has been 
predictably advantageous to lawyers.  Courts have used their inherent 
authority to create unified bars in multiple states (in these states all licensed 
lawyers must belong to the state bar association), to prosecute the 
unauthorized practice of law, to adopt the American Bar Association’s 
(ABA) Rules of Professional Conduct, and to require bar passage and 
attendance at an ABA-accredited law school.88 
Generally speaking, state supreme courts have not proven particularly 
interested in the nuts and bolts of lawyer regulation.  As a result, they have 
either formally or informally delegated much of their regulatory authority to 
bar associations.89  For example, the ABA drafts the rules of professional 
responsibility in the first instance and, in unified bar states, the bar 
associations run most aspects of lawyer regulation.90 
Thus, American lawyers have a unique claim to self-regulation.  All other 
professions, from doctors to hairdressers, are regulated in the first instance 
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by state legislatures.  Lawyers, by contrast, are regulated by other 
lawyers—the justices of their state supreme courts. 
A.  The Unauthorized Practice of Law 
UPL is prohibited in all fifty states.91  The definition of the “practice of 
law” and the levels of enforcement differ from state to state,92 but at a 
minimum in no state may a nonlawyer appear in court on behalf of another 
party.93  Likewise, nonlawyers may not give “legal advice.”  State bars have 
long allowed the publication of “forms books” despite the UPL strictures, 
but have drawn the line at the provision of advice along with forms.94 
Internet forms providers present a hybrid UPL case.  A human does not 
offer advice along with the forms or fill the forms out for someone else, but 
the websites are packed with instructions and suggestions that look a lot 
like advice.  LegalZoom, for example, sells both blank forms for customers 
to fill in themselves, which courts have found to be virtually identical to a 
formbook,95 and interactive forms, where the customers answer questions 
and LegalZoom builds out the forms.96 
Nevertheless, lawyer regulators have yet to launch an all out assault on 
computerization.  LegalZoom debuted in 2001 and has only faced three real 
UPL challenges.  The Washington State attorney general investigated 
LegalZoom for UPL in 2010.  LegalZoom settled by paying $20,000 in 
costs and agreeing not to violate Washington law, while continuing to 
operate in the state with no changes in its business practices.97  In 2011, a 
private lawyer in Missouri filed a class action UPL suit against 
LegalZoom.98  The case was settled before trial when LegalZoom agreed to 
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a small payment and some unspecified changes in its business practices.99  
LegalZoom lost its summary judgment motion and a Missouri federal 
district court held that interactive forms constitute the unauthorized practice 
of law.100  The CEO of LegalZoom stated that they settled the suit “with 
little change in [the] business, agreeing mainly to pay lawyers’ fees”101 and 
LegalZoom operates the same in Missouri as it does in other states. 
LegalZoom has actually brought suit against the state bar in North 
Carolina, seeking a declaratory judgment that it is not engaging in UPL.102  
So far LegalZoom has survived a motion to dismiss, but the district court 
has not ruled on the central UPL issue.103 
B.  Why So Little UPL Activity? 
There are several reasons for the relative lack of UPL challenges brought 
by lawyer regulators against these new operators.  Lawyers have been a 
little like a frog in a pot of slowly heating water.  They did not notice the 
threat that computerized legal services presented until it was too late.  At 
first, LegalZoom and other internet providers were no competition at all.  
The forms themselves were rudimentary and not even jurisdiction specific, 
and LegalZoom’s clients likely could not afford a lawyer anyway.  This is 
especially likely because hiring a lawyer is too expensive for most 
Americans to afford.104 
As the forms have improved and public acceptance has risen, however, 
people who could otherwise afford a lawyer have started using online 
providers.  For example, a colleague of mine recently decided to update his 
will.  He called the lawyer who had written the first will ten years ago and 
was so stunned by the cost that he built a new will on LegalZoom for 
roughly one-tenth the price. 
Given LegalZoom’s rise, scrutiny will likely increase.105  Nevertheless, 
at this point, LegalZoom is a famous company with a large advertising 
budget.106  Any effort to put it out of business in any particular state would 
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bring significant negative attention to that state’s lawyer regulators.  For 
example, in the late 1990s, the State Bar of Texas successfully prosecuted 
an offline program called “Quicken Family Lawyer” for UPL, only to be 
briskly overruled by the Texas legislature.107 
Likewise, in the early 2000s, the ABA sought to create a model 
definition of the practice of law,108 likely as a precursor to increased UPL 
enforcement.  The U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade 
Commission quickly sent the ABA a comment letter objecting to the 
proposed definition as overbroad and anticompetitive.109  Given that the 
ABA settled an antitrust investigation over its accreditation of law schools 
in 1995,110 this letter was a shot across the bow on UPL. 
There is also a broader enforcement problem:  even if UPL challenges 
could destroy LegalZoom, what about the websites that promise that a 
lawyer “reviews” the documentation?  These sites are priced competitively 
with LegalZoom and are much cheaper than a traditional lawyer, so the 
problem would persist even with aggressive UPL enforcement. 
In the corporate law arena, UPL challenges are also unlikely to succeed, 
because as long as a lawyer supervises the work (i.e., inside counsel or a big 
firm), the work has generally not been considered UPL.  Lawyer regulators 
have also historically left corporate law firms to their own devices:  state 
bar complaints or investigations are extremely rare, as are UPL 
prosecutions.111 
III.  FORMAL LAWYER REGULATION WILL LIKELY REMAIN  
LARGELY THE SAME 
In 2008, Rahm Emanuel reminded us that we should never let a crisis go 
to waste,112 and proponents of changes in lawyer regulation have taken that 
advice to heart.  There have been increased calls for the slackening of 
UPL,113 allowing nonlawyers to provide simple legal services,114 and the 
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corporate ownership of law firms.115  Likewise, Richard Posner, Deborah 
Rhode, and others have criticized the utility of the third year of law 
school.116 
Nevertheless, even in the teeth of great change in the legal profession, it 
seems likely that lawyer regulators will stand pat.  Why?  The changes at 
hand are so profound, the possible effects of any changes so unclear, the 
antipathy of the public towards lawyer self-interest so deep, and the 
profession sufficiently divided and demoralized that the regulatory status 
quo will appear the safest route. 
A.  Disruptive Innovations and Market Uncertainty 
Clayton Christensen’s book The Innovator’s Dilemma presents a model 
for disruptive technologies that readily applies to lawyers.117  Christensen 
argues that disruptive technologies tend to come from the lower end of the 
market.118  The competitors start by focusing on a segment of the market 
that is lower margin, frequently offering a worse product to these customers 
at much cheaper prices.119  The producers at the top of the market who are 
providing the higher-margin goods are at first unconcerned.120  Why would 
they worry about losing the low end of the market when they are 
dominating the higher-margin work?  At first this strategy actually 
improves profitability, as market leaders abandon low-margin work to focus 
on the most profitable areas.121  Further, the high-end producers do not 
want to compete with the low-end producers:  the disruptive product is 
worse, much cheaper, and lower margin, so competing with the disruptive 
technology might even cannibalize more profitable sales.122 
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But the producers in the lower end of the market eventually master the 
low-margin work and gradually work their way up the chain to compete for 
the higher-margin work.123  Thus, what appears to be the best strategy short 
term turns out to be disastrous long term, as the disruptive technology 
eventually captures most or all of the market.124 
Established providers tend to double down on what they have always 
done, rather than try to compete with the innovative technology.125  
Uncertainty also tends to breed inertia.126  Lastly, it is hard to teach old 
dogs new tricks.  The legacy industry is expert at one way of doing 
business, but the disruptive innovation presents a radically different 
model.127 
The reaction of lawyers to their changed circumstances has been straight 
out of this playbook:  they ignored computerization at first.  Then they 
dismissed it.  Now they deride it as substandard, but have largely failed to 
meet the competition head on.  This provides a market opportunity for the 
lawyers that have adopted virtual and online law practices.  But it presents a 
significant challenge to everyone else.  Frequently these sorts of challenges 
have been met by inertia rather than radical change. 
B.  The Public Will Not Stand for a UPL Revolution 
LegalZoom and other computerized providers of legal services have 
grown prevalent and profitable enough to present a strong challenge to any 
UPL enforcement effort.  Generally speaking, UPL enforcement has been at 
its most robust when aimed against individuals.  For example, one of the 
more notable UPL cases against a computerized form punished the 
individual who filled an electronic will form for an elderly neighbor, rather 
than the form provider itself.128  Similarly, publishers of legal forms have 
had more success fighting UPL than individual nonlawyer scriveners.129  
This is because individuals often lack the funds or political power to defend 
themselves.  So UPL prosecutions of small legal websites are more likely to 
proceed and succeed than any prosecution large enough to slow the current 
tide. 
C.  Bar Associations and State Supreme Courts  
Still Run Lawyer Regulation 
The two subsections above explain why a large-scale UPL attack on 
nonlawyers and computers is unlikely.  This section explains why other 
regulatory changes are likely to flounder. 
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The first reason is that many of the current demands for change are 
responses to general, longstanding problems and not a response to the 
current challenge to lawyer hegemony.  For example, there has been a 
renewed effort to push law schools to provide more practical training.130  
Nevertheless, teaching law graduates the basics of actually practicing law 
has been an obvious need since law schools and the case method replaced 
apprenticeships for lawyer training.131  Graduating practice-ready lawyers 
might help an individual school’s students compete in a tough market, but it 
does nothing to address the baseline problem:  due to changes in the market, 
there are too few jobs.  It also begs the question of what “practice ready” 
means in a radically shifting market. 
Second, barring turnover in who regulates law schools (the ABA and 
state supreme courts), no large changes are likely to happen in the near 
term.  Why?  Because any large-scale changes would cost a lot of money, 
reduce tuition, or increase competition in a crowded market.  State supreme 
courts and the ABA control admission to the profession and the 
accreditation of American law schools.  These bodies have proven 
predictably responsive to their main constituencies (lawyers and law 
schools),132 so for any proposed solution one should ask “would ABA 
members or law school faculties and administrators object to this change?”  
If the answer is yes, the change is unlikely to occur. 
Take the idea of a two-year law school program.  Northwestern 
University Law School offers a two-year program, but those students pay 
full tuition and attend school full-time through two or three summer 
sessions.133  That two-year program is just a three-year program squeezed 
into two full years.  A true two-year program would require fewer credit 
hours and would be cheaper and faster.  That would result in more law 
graduates, fewer total students per year, or both.  In short, an ABA-
accredited, two-year program would be a disaster for already struggling law 
schools and a saturated job market.  Even if state supreme courts and the 
ABA thought these ideas were worth pursuing, the opposition from law 
school deans and the rank and file would be excruciating. 
Likewise, consider the failure of the ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 
to address the prohibition of nonlawyer ownership of law firms.  William 
Henderson has rightly called the prohibition a “farce” that keeps lawyers 
from engaging with the world of nonlegal entities that are entering the 
field.134  Nevertheless, bar associations have asked the band to play on as 
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the ship sinks around them, arguing over ethics rules that only bind a very 
limited group of lawyers.135 
There has been quite a bit of controversy over a recent ABA Task Force 
on the Future of Legal Education report, which called for liberalizing or 
eliminating a number of accreditation standards.136  The recommendations 
have proven controversial,137 and time will tell if they have much effect 
when they reach the broader membership of the ABA. 
Similarly, based on the Washington State “limited license legal 
technicians”138 (LLLT) program described more fully in Laurel Rigertas’s 
article,139 there is much hope that nonlawyers may finally be able to 
compete with lawyers in providing legal services.  The Washington 
program is less than it appears, however.  It does not loosen UPL 
restrictions.  To the contrary, it attempts to extend regulatory authority to 
nonlawyers in the field. 
In Washington State, nonlawyers will be licensed and allowed to draft 
legal instruments in limited areas (at first, just domestic relations) and offer 
related advice.140  The LLLTs will not be allowed to appear in court.141  At 
first blush, this appears to be a significant and unexpected concession by the 
Washington Supreme Court.  There have been unsuccessful efforts to 
loosen UPL to address access to justice concerns for years.  Deborah Rhode 
led a very persuasive and successful one-woman charge against UPL in the 
1970s and 1980s.142  In 1995, the ABA Commission on Nonlawyer Practice 
was finally persuaded, releasing a report describing the legal work that legal 
paraprofessionals already safely performed and suggesting that the ABA 
reconsider its ethics rules and its description of the unauthorized practice of 
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law to allow greater freedom.143  The ABA ignored the reports and many 
local bar associations ramped up UPL enforcement afterwards.144 
So maybe Washington’s action is a significant deregulation?  Not so 
much.  First, the Washington State Bar Association (and not the Supreme 
Court) will license and regulate LLLTs in the first instance, making any 
radical new competition from nonlawyers unlikely.145  Second, the rules for 
becoming an LLLT are quite stringent, including years of school146 and 
apprenticeship,147 making a flood of new entrants unlikely.  Third, in some 
ways the regulations are already stricter for LLLTs than lawyers.  LLLTs 
must carry malpractice insurance, for example.148  Last, the new program is 
not a loosening of UPL.  To the contrary, it is an attempt to regulate more 
of the market for legal services, by essentially regulating paralegals.  Thus, 
the entire program may be a stalking horse for greater tightening of lawyer 
control. 
IV.  A CONCLUSION WITH SOME HEDGING 
Hard times can bring bad regulation.  The Depression was the last time 
that the American legal profession faced an existential threat.  State 
supreme courts and the ABA responded by ratcheting up entry regulations 
and heavily prosecuting UPL.149  If the protectionist approach repeated 
itself today, it would reverse much of what I have argued elsewhere is a 
helpful loosening of the market for legal services.150 
The relevant question is whether bar associations and courts will remain 
relatively passive as the market for legal services changes (or collapses) 
around them.  If the market for lawyers continues to shrink, bar associations 
and state supreme courts may want to do something. 
An alternative to large-scale changes or aggressive UPL enforcement 
may be lower-profile moves like quietly adjusting the bar passage rate 
downwards or disaccrediting some law schools.  Low-profile tightening 
seems much more likely than any loosening or radical changes. 
The likeliest result is that regulations for law schools and lawyers stay 
basically the same, but grow less relevant, as everything except for in-court 
and other bespoke legal work is swamped by competition from computers, 
outsourcing, and nonlawyers.  Rather than try to regain lost ground, lawyers 
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and law schools will try to hold on to what they still have, even as it shrinks 
around them.  I think of it as a sand castle facing a rising tide:  the outer 
walls will be lost, but perhaps the citadel can be maintained. 
There is the possibility for some targeted deregulation to allow lawyers to 
compete more effectively with the explosion of nonlawyer services on the 
internet.  Right now, regulatory sluggishness is keeping many lawyers on 
the sideline while unregulated nonlawyers are rushing in.  For example, the 
ABA and most state bar associations continue to drag their feet on changes 
to ABA Model Rule of Professional Responsibility 5.4, which bars 
nonlawyer ownership of law firms and sharing legal fees with 
nonlawyers.151  As Bill Henderson has noted, this ban is allowing 
nonlawyers to provide legal-type services in multiple guises and with 
creative financing, while leaving law firms hamstrung.152  Gillian Hadfield 
has argued that loosening Rule 5.4 would also greatly increase access to 
justice, because nonlawyer owners could leverage economies of scale and 
logistics to streamline the types of representation needed by the poor and 
middle class.153 
Regulatory bans on multijurisdictional law practice likewise make it hard 
for licensed lawyers to compete on the internet.  LegalZoom and Rocket 
Lawyer are available in all fifty states.  A lawyer-run virtual law practice, 
however, must satisfy licensing requirements of each jurisdiction, making a 
national virtual law firm competitor a very difficult proposition.154 
The alternative—a full-scale attempt to bring nonlawyers, outsourcing, 
and computerization to heel via UPL or more aggressive regulation—would 
require a great deal of political will and capital from state supreme courts.  
Truly aggressive moves would be likely to draw federal antitrust and 
congressional attention.  If push came to shove, state supreme courts and 
lawyer regulators would face a potentially existential crisis:  attempting to 
maintain their inherent authority to regulate lawyers against an angry 
populace and an engaged federal government.  It is well beyond the scope 
of this Article to determine whether federal supremacy would overrule 
bedrock state constitutional law in such a showdown.  Simply describing 
the parameters of the potential showdown helps explain why lawyer 
regulators have and will continue to tread lightly. 
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The most likely result is little formal change amidst massive informal 
changes.  This will have a negative impact on the legal profession, which 
will need to find new sources of business or will face significant shrinkage.  
It will be outstanding news for the public at large.  In 2001, I joined a 
distinguished chorus of legal scholars—Deborah Rhode, Stephen Gillers, 
and David Luban—in calling for large-scale deregulation of the legal 
profession.  It appears my hopes for massive changes in lawyer regulation 
will remain unfulfilled.  My hope for a deregulated market for legal 
services, however, is coming true before our eyes.  Given that much lawyer 
regulation is protectionist and not aimed at benefitting the public and that 
most Americans cannot afford a lawyer for even relatively basic legal 
needs, if this deregulation continues unabated, the broader public will be the 
beneficiaries. 
 
